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South Korea has undergone a rapid process of democratization over the past decade.
Two factors stand out as forces that have significantly influenced the democratic tran-
sition: the growth of citizens’ organizations and the Internet news services that have
provided the forum for citizens’ participation in formulating public opinion. The pri-
mary purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of Internet politics and citizens’
organizations on the nomination and campaign processes of the 2002 presidential elec-
tion in South Korea. The two major presidential candidates, Roh Moo Hyun of the
Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) and Lee Hoi Chang of the Grand National
Party (GNP), had diametrically opposing characteristics, not only in ideological and
political stances, but also in personal and family backgrounds. An important aspect of
the 2002 South Korean presidential election was that major parties selected their nomi-
nees through presidential primaries, the first time ever in the history of South Korean
presidential elections. A citizens’ political fan club (Nosamo) played a critical role in
the MDP primaries as well as in Roh Moo Hyun’s winning campaign in the presiden-
tial election, by mobilizing young voters as a formidable voting bloc. In addition, the
Oh my News, an on-line news service organization, empowered voters to effectively
respond to changing conditions in the presidential race and organized a series of anti-
American candlelight demonstrations that helped to solidify the progressive segment of
voters in supporting Roh Moo Hyun. Citizens’ organizations and Internet politics
would continue to make significant contributions to the consolidation of democracy in
South Korea.
Key Words: South Korea, presidential election, citizens’ organizations, Internet poli-
tics, consolidation of democracy
INTRODUCTION
South Korean society has undergone democratization processes in eco-
nomic, political, and social structures over the past ten years under two
civilian presidents. The economic and political reforms that the Kim Young
Sam and Kim Dae Jung administrations have instituted are remarkable. In
the past decade, civil society has been transformed into an effective political
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force that impacts the political system through various channels of partic-
ipation (Choi, 2002; Cho and Park, 2002; Kim, 2000; Shin, 2003a; Steinberg,
2000; Wein, 2000). The rapid multiplication of citizens’ organizations
addressing such diverse and important issues as civil rights, gender, the
economy, the environment, education, and public health in the 1990s, has
complemented the economic and political reforms initiated by Korean polit-
ical society, including the executive, legislative and judicial organizations
(Cho and Park, 2002; Kim, 2000; Shin, 2003b; Wein, 2000). 
The Directory of Korean NGOs, published in 1999 by the Citizens’
Movement Communication Center, listed 7,600 organizations. A factor that
has contributed to the proliferation of civic organizations has been the
increase in government financial assistance to civic organizations under the
Kim Dae Jung administration (Kim, 2001; Wein, 2000). The administration
hoped that non-governmental organizations would initiate a citizen’s move-
ment to overcome the financial crisis of 1997.
The growing interest of citizens in political and economic reforms and
other societal issues has coincided with the Kim Dae Jung administration’s
drive to mobilize popular support for its political and public policy agen-
das. Many of the leaders of civic organizations participated in the democra-
tization movement of the 1980s. Thus, they were previously committed to
the reform movement and had substantial experience in running non-gov-
ernmental organizations. Civic organizations such as the Citizens’ Coalition
for Economic Justice (CCEJ), People’s Solidarity for Participatory
Democracy (PSPD), Green Korea United (GKU), and the Korean Foundation
for Environmental Movement (KFEM) had established national networks,
well-organized administrative structures, and solid reputations in terms of
their programs and records of accomplishment.
A second factor that has provided a favorable environment for the devel-
opment of citizens’ organizations has been a growing distrust of politicians,
political parties, and political systems in general. Former presidents and
their family members have been at the center of a series of major scandals
involving corruption, bribery and other abuses of political power and posi-
tions. Furthermore, the 1997 financial crisis revealed the incompetence and
inefficiency of the government bureaucracy, as well as the lack of trans-
parency of the political system (Lee, 2000; Kim, 2000). On the whole, the
increased distrust of the political system, the favorable environment for
activities of non-governmental organizations and the availability of experi-
enced civic organizational leadership have provided ideal conditions for the
participation of civic organizations in the political process (Kim, 2000).
On January 12, 2000, the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Elections
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(CAGE) was formally organized, with more than 450 civic organizations as
participating members. Its immediate plans included organizing a cam-
paign against Article 87 of the Election Law that prohibited civic organiza-
tions from engaging in election-related campaign activities. Other major
plans were to develop a set of guidelines for the nomination of candidates
for the National Assembly, and to publish a list of politicians whom they
deemed unfit to be candidates for the 16th National Assembly election on
April 13, 2000.
The CAGE blacklisting and defeat campaigns had significant effects on
both the nomination processes of candidates by major parties, as well as on
the final outcomes of the National Assembly election on April 13, 2000.
However, the significance of CAGE activities goes far beyond their effects
on the election results. In the context of Korean political history, the CAGE
campaign signified citizens reclaiming the long-lost right for self-determina-
tion, and securing basic rights guaranteed in a participatory democracy.
Furthermore, the anti-nomination and defeat campaigns by CAGE against
blacklisted politicians can be viewed as a people’s resistance movement, or
as a civil disobedience movement against the political party-centered elec-
tion systems and undemocratic political practices that essentially limited the
participation of civil society in the election process (Cho, 2002; Moon, 2000;
Shin, 2003a; Steinberg, 2000; Wein, 2000).
The presidential election that was held on December 19, 2002 had several
important dimensions in the evolution of South Korean politics. To become
their party’s nominees, both Lee Hoi Chang (GNP) and Roh Moo Hyun
(MDP) went through their respective party’s presidential primaries, the first
time ever in the history of South Korean presidential elections. In the past,
each party’s presidential nominee was selected at the party’s national con-
vention, where the party’s delegates from election districts would partic-
ipate in the selection process. Under this system, the party boss would have
enormous influence over the entire nomination process, from the selection
of convention delegates at local district levels, to the handpicking of the
nominee. Factions within a party also played important roles in that they
would form coalitions on the basis of their political interests. Thus, deal
making, vote buying, and factional fighting had frequently been observed in
the nomination conventions of major parties. In view of the long history of
the candidate nomination procedure, the introduction of presidential pri-
maries by major parties in itself was a truly significant watershed in party
and election politics in South Korea.
The two major presidential candidates, Roh Moo Hyun and Lee Hoi
Chang, had diametrically opposing characteristics, not only in ideological
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and political stances, but also in personal and family backgrounds. Roh
Moo Hyun was born to a poor farming family, finished a commercial high
school, and taught himself to pass the bar examination. He defended young
college students who were arrested and tried for their participation in the
street demonstrations and underground activities against the authoritarian
military regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. Roh Moo Hyun served two terms
in the National Assembly and also served as Minister of the Maritime and
Fishery Ministry in the Kim Dae Jung administration. He showed progres-
sive ideological and political orientations in that he supported Kim Dae
Jung’s “sunshine policy” toward North Korea. He also supported re-estab-
lishing Korean-U.S. relations as equals; he asserted the need for further
reform of the chaebol groups and has advocated for the rights of labor
unions. Lee, on the other hand, was born and raised in an upper class fami-
ly; his father was a public prosecutor. Lee graduated from an elite high
school and university, had a very successful legal career as a judge in the
court system, and became a Supreme Court justice before his appointment
as Prime Minister by President Kim Young Sam in 1993. He also ran unsuc-
cessfully against Kim Dae Jung in the 1997 presidential race and remained
as head of the opposition party, GNP. His position on inter-Korean and
Korea-U.S. relations, chaebol groups, and labor union issues was opposite
of Roh’s position. 
In the entire process of the MDP primaries, the role of one group truly
stood out: “Nosamo,” which literally means “People Who Love Roh Moo
Hyun.” It was a political “fan club” that supported Roh Moo Hyun as a
politician and as a candidate in the MDP primaries. It would not be an exag-
geration to argue that the Nosamo played a critical role in Roh Moo Hyun’s
success in the MDP primaries, as well as in his winning campaign in the
presidential election.
Role of Media in Politics
In South Korea, the media has been a key player in the unrelenting strug-
gle for democratization throughout the successive authoritarian military
regimes. The media stood up against the regimes by questioning their legiti-
macy, and by criticizing oppressive policies and undemocratic practices.
The media, especially the printed media, have earned the respect and trust
of voters. Thus, editorials and news reports have had profound effects on
the formation of public opinion on various issues, including voters’ atti-
tudes toward political parties, political candidates, and campaign issues.
Media organizations have traditionally attracted many college educated and
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politically ambitious young individuals for their initial and preparatory
careers as reporters before they embark on political careers. A substantial
number of both past and present National Assembly members, cabinet
members, and high-ranking government officials have backgrounds as
reporters of media organizations. Furthermore, many of the “386 genera-
tion” (those who are in their 30s, entered college in 1980s, and were born in
1960s), with progressive ideological and political orientations, are currently
dominating the rank and file of the staff of major media organizations in
South Korea. The net effect of the composition of the personnel in the media
organizations has been to make the media’s orientations progressive on
inter-Korean affairs, anti-American, and critical of the chaebol groups and of
the established economic and political elite. 
However, many of the major newspapers are family owned and have
become fairly large, highly profitable business organizations. They own and
operate various subsidiaries, including weekly, monthly, sports, women’s,
and children’ journals and magazines. In addition, they have organized and
sponsored profitable cultural, entertainment, and sports events. Until the
time when Kim Dae Jung won the presidential election in 1997, the major
newspapers had enjoyed a special status as exceptions to possible scrutiny
by the government, and especially by the tax agency, due to the traditional
practice of protecting the freedom of press. However, the size and scope of
business activities of these newspapers, as well as those of their owners,
reached the point where government agencies began to review the financial
reports of the newspapers and their parent companies.
More importantly, the editorial orientations of the major newspapers
tended to be conservative in terms of ideological issues, especially inter-
Korean relations. Thus, these newspapers were at odds with President Kim
Dae Jung, who advocated the “sunshine policy,” a liberal engagement poli-
cy toward North Korea. In fact, Kim Dae Jung and his party leadership
believed that the newspapers unfairly treated them during the 1997 presi-
dential campaign, as well as his administration after he was elected presi-
dent. Major newspapers maintained these critical attitudes towards Kim
Dae Jung and his administration, especially regarding regional favoritism in
key appointments, corruption, and political influence peddling scandals
involving his sons and close confidants.
From the beginning of the Kim Dae Jung administration, a primary eco-
nomic, financial and political reform agenda was the reform of media orga-
nizations. The National Tax Agency (NTA) conducted a series of tax audit-
ing of several major newspapers in 1999. NTA reported that it had discov-
ered that several newspapers had evaded paying a large amount of taxes.
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As a result of the tax investigation, several newspapers were fined and
ordered to pay the back taxes they owed. In addition, several owners of
major newspapers were arrested on tax evasion charges, and subsequently,
were found guilty and sentenced to jail terms. This seriously tainted the
public image of the major newspapers. In particular, college students and
young intellectuals criticized Chosun Ilbo, the largest and most influential
daily in Korea, for its critical attitude toward Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine pol-
icy,” and its ideologically conservative stance. In addition, Roh Moo Hyun,
then a presidential candidate who was very popular among college students
and young voters, had a continuing feud with Chosun Ilbo because of inci-
dents that involved the newspaper’s reports about Roh’s personal life and
family background. The conflict led to a boycott movement of Chosun Ilbo
by some college students and young progressive groups. Although the
impact of the movement on the newspaper did not seem to be serious, the
newspaper suffered a setback in terms of its image and prestige. 
Internet News Media
Another important development in the South Korean mass media indus-
try over the past five years has been the emergence of the Internet news ser-
vice. The Kim Dae Jung administration has spearheaded the development of
the information technology sector by providing a substantial amount of
public funds. An outcome of the government policy was the spread of
broadband Internet access. South Korea ranks 6th in the world in the num-
ber of Internet users, behind only the United States, Japan, China, Germany,
and the United Kingdom. Nearly 67 percent of South Korean households
have broadband, and “this high-speed service means that people use the
Internet more, spending an average of 1,340 minutes on line per month”
(Watts, 2003). With the rapid growth of Internet use, Internet news service
organizations have grown exponentially in recent years. 
The leading on-line newspaper is Oh my News. Ohmynews.com was
founded in December 2000. It had a full-time staff and 700 “guerrilla
reporters,” using the approach that it would provide 24 hours a day news
services as well as the forum for dialogue among citizens on various current
issues (Joongang Ilbo, February 24, 2003; Monthly Joongang, March 2003).
As of February 2003, Oh my News has 45 full-time staff and more than 23,000
“citizen reporters” who contribute nearly 80 percent of stories reported by
the Internet newspaper (BusinessWeek, February, 24, 2003). With more than
3 million readers, Oh my News has become an influential news service in
South Korea. In addition, with its young, idealistic, and progressive staff
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reporters, led by its 38 year-old founder who was a former student activist,
Oh my News has played an important role in generating young voters’ inter-
est in current political issues, as well as candidates and campaign issues in
the elections. In particular, by providing a forum for on-line debate between
those who post news and reports and readers with conflicting viewpoints,
the Internet news service transformed the nature of forming public opin-
ions. In other words, an average citizen who tended to be a passive recipient
of news reports by traditional newspapers, television and radio stations, has
become an active participant in the debates on the various current issues.
Moreover, the transactions are nearly instantaneous in that a reader can
comment on a report and the comment will appear almost immediately on
the on-line commentary/message board with points and counter points
made by others. Participation in the on-line debate forum has raised the
political sensitivity of not only those who actually post their viewpoints, but
also of the readers in general. On the whole, as BusinessWeek noted with a
headline of “The Web Site That Elected a President (BusinessWeek, February
14, 2003),” Oh my News has had a significant effect on the MDP’s presiden-
tial primaries, campaign process, and the election outcomes of the 2002
presidential election. 
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of Internet politics and
citizens’ organizations on the nomination and campaign processes of the
2002 presidential election in South Korea. In the first section of this paper, I
will review the candidate nomination processes of each major party through
primaries. In the second section, I will document the history of “Nosamo,” a
political fan club of a presidential candidate, and the role that organization
played in the primaries and the election. I will focus on how the Internet has
been used to empower young voters in mobilizing themselves as a formida-
ble voting bloc, as well as in effectively responding to changing conditions
of the presidential race. In addition, I will discuss the abuses and problems
of Internet politics as they were manifested in the 2002 presidential election
in South Korea. It should be noted that Korean election law prohibits any
campaign activities in support of a specific candidate by any organizations
other than the registered and recognized political parties. In fact, during the
official campaign period, which is only about four weeks long, even clan,
alumni, and home town association meetings are not allowed, in order to
prevent any possible use of such gatherings for election campaign purposes.
Nosamo’s activities had to end with Roh Moo Hyun’s win of the MDP pres-
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS & INTERNET POLITICS 31
idential primaries in order to comply with the election law. Thus, in this
paper, I will focus on the role of Nosamo in the MDP primaries. 
ANALYSIS
Data and Methods 
The National Election Commission (NEC) provides historical information
on the results of local, parliamentary, and presidential elections at its web-
site (www.nec.go.kr). The data used in this study are drawn from the web-
site. In addition, I use data compiled by four major daily newspapers and
an on-line news service: Chosun (www.chosun.com), Joongang
(www.joins.com), Donga (www.donga.com), and Hankyoreh
(www.hani.co.kr) and Oh my News (www.ohmynews.com). I especially
focus on the data on each political party’s presidential primaries from the
newspapers. For the results of tracking polls on candidates, I use the web-
site of the Gallup Korea (www.gallup.co.kr), along with websites of the four
major newspapers. 
Presidential Primaries
Although both GNP and MDP had presidential primaries, MDP adopted
the primary system before GNP. To a certain extent, the adoption of the pri-
mary system by MDP forced GNP to follow. In this context, it may be rea-
sonable to suggest that MDP gave the voters a positive impression by
demonstrating its willingness to reform the party’s political system, more so
than GNP did (Joongang Ilbo, February 19, 2002; March 11, 2002). It should
be noted that MDP was seriously concerned with a sharp decline in its pop-
ularity among voters, due to revelations of corruption and scandals involv-
ing President Kim Dae Jung’s sons and his inner circle confidants. MDP des-
perately needed to transform their public image and attract voter’s interest
and support, and its leadership believed that the presidential primary was
their ticket (Joongang Ilbo, January 14, 2002).
MDP’s presidential primaries began on March 9, 2002 in Cheju and ended
on April 27, 2002 in Seoul. In all, the MDP primaries were held at 16 differ-
ent cities/provinces. MDP primaries were a hybrid of closed and open sys-
tems in that the eligible participants in the primaries consisted of the party’s
precinct level delegates (20%), randomly selected party members from the
local district party members pool (30%), and randomly selected voters from
the pool of general voters of respective areas who submitted their applica-
tions to participate in the primary to MDP (50%). MDP argued that its sys-
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tem would accommodate not only the preferences of party members, but
also the opinions of the general public regarding the candidates.
MDP primaries attracted much interest from the public; in many areas the
number of general voter applicants was nearly a hundred times greater than
the available slots.
Seven candidates entered MDP’s primary in Cheju, and no clear front-
runner emerged after the first two primaries in Cheju and Ulsan. Two candi-
dates dropped out of the race after the second primary. The third primary
was held in Kwangju/Chonnam on March 16, 2002, and it was very impor-
tant in the sense that Kwangju has historically been a center of the Kim Dae
Jung’s and MDP’s stronghold. Voters in the area would support the candi-
date who was favored by Kim Dae Jung, although he had declared that he
would be impartial and endorse whoever won the primaries. The third pri-
mary in Kwangju turned out to be critical in that Roh Moo Hyun (37.9%)
edged his top rivals (31.3 % for Lee In Jeh and 17.9% for Han Hwa Gap) in
that primary. The expectation was that Han Hwa Gap, whose regional ori-
gin is Honam, and who was believed to be a favorite son of
Kwangju/Chonnam, would win the primary. In addition, it was expected
that Lee In Jeh, who ran as a third party candidate in the 1997 presidential
race, would do well, considering his name recognition within the party as
well as among voters in general. The Lee In Jeh camp accused Kim Dae Jung
of a conspiracy and behind the scene influence, following the
Kwangju/Chonnam primary, but Kim Dae Jung’s aides denied the charges. 
Although Lee In Jeh won the next two primaries in Taejun and
Chungnam (his home region and political support base), by wide margins
over Roh Moo Hyun (67.5% vs. 16.5 % in Taejun, 73.7% vs. 14.2% in
Chungnam), critics projected that Roh Moo Hyun would win MDP’s nomi-
nation. By the time the 7th primary was held in Kyongnam, Roh’s home
province, two more candidates had exited the race. After losing the pri-
maries in Taejun and Chungnam, Roh Moo Hyun won the next six pri-
maries. Lee In Jeh decided to drop out of the race after the April 14 primary
in Chonbuk, leaving only two candidates, Roh and Chung Dong Young, in
the primaries. This all but assured Roh’s nomination as MDP’s presidential
candidate although the two primaries at Inchon and Seoul were yet to be
completed. Roh Moo Hyun won 11 out of the total 16 primaries and
received 72.2% of the total votes cast in the primaries (Korea Now, May 4,
2002). 
Several important developments were connected with the MDP pri-
maries. First, as indicated earlier, the primary system generated great inter-
est even among voters who were not affiliated with MDP. This interest was
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS & INTERNET POLITICS 33
clearly reflected in the number of nonparty member voters who applied for
participation in the primaries, although many of the voters were recruited
by the camps of different candidates in the race. Second, the primaries pro-
vided candidates with opportunities to be exposed to eligible voters in the
primaries, as well as to the general public through media coverage. Third,
the differences among the candidates in terms of policy proposals, cam-
paign promises, and personalities became increasingly apparent through
repeated joint appearances in organized political forums. Fourth, MDP
introduced an electronic voting system for all the primaries, and the results
were tabulated and announced immediately following the completion of
balloting. The use of high technology gave a very positive impression about
the accuracy and cleanness of the entire nomination process. Fifth, the actu-
al events of the primaries were organized in a festive atmosphere that
involved staged hoopla in indoor stadiums, unlike traditional party conven-
tions that tended to be boring and somber. This style of primaries especially
catered to the taste of relatively young voters. 
The Role of Citizens’ Organizations in the Presidential Election: The Case of
“Nosamo.”
The idea about forming a citizen’s support group for Roh Moo Hyun
started immediately following his loss in the National Assembly election of
April 13, 2000. Although he would have easily won a seat in the National
Assembly had he run in one of the election districts in Seoul, he purposely
decided to run as an MDP nominee in one of the districts in Pusan— a GNP
stronghold. He wanted to challenge the Pusan voters to put aside regional
animosity and long-standing negative sentiments toward Kim Dae Jung’s
MDP. Roh Moo Hyun asserted that true democratization of the Korean
political system would not be realized without expelling regionalism in
elections.
Immediately after Roh’s defeat in the National Assembly election of April
13, 2000, his website’s bulletin board was bombarded by citizens’ sympa-
thetic and encouraging messages. Individuals who visited Roh’s home page
posted messages that suggested forming an organization of supporters of
Roh Moo Hyun. On May 7, 2000, approximately forty people from all over
the country attended a preliminary organizational meeting in Taejun. They
were quite diverse in terms of age and occupational backgrounds, ranging
from high school students to professionals in their forties. The initial project
of the organizing committee was to construct an official home page of the
organization on the Internet. The official home page was open on May 17,
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2000 with the website address of www.nomuhyun.org. The home page
address was changed subsequently to www.nosamo.org. 
Soon after the opening of the official home page, the date of the inaugural
meeting and the constitution were voted on electronically by members
using member’s identification numbers and passwords to cast their ballots
at the website (www.nosamo.org/home/etc/nosamo-intro4.asp). The mem-
bers voted to adopt the constitution that was labeled as “the promise of
Nosamo,” which contained only three sentences: “1) I will, together with
Roh Moo Hyun, participate in overcoming the distorted regional sentiment
in our country. 2) For the development of true democracy, I will participate
voluntarily in the activity programs that would be adopted by the Nosamo
members. 3) The promise of Nosamo and the recorded precedents of
Nosamo activities will substitute the constitution, and the promise and
precedents can be modified only through an electronic voting by the entire
Nosamo membership (Shin 2002).” The person who initially proposed the
“Promise of Nosamo” asserted that Nosamo is striving to become a model
Internet activity group that would provide an alternative direction to old-
fashioned politics, and that Nosamo would conduct its activities on the
basis of operation procedures that best fit its purposes.
The inaugural meeting was held on June 6, 2000 at a “PC Room” in Taejun
(Shin, 2002). Of the total 500 members at that time, 100 members attended
the meeting. Roh Moo Hyun attended the meeting and the Oh my News had
a live Internet broadcast of the proceedings of the inaugural meeting.
Myung Keh Nam, a fairly well known movie actor, was elected as “a nation-
al representative worker” (president) via electronic voting during the two-
day period of July 20-22, 2000. One hundred and eighty-six of the total 745
members participated in the voting. When the first anniversary conference
was held on June 6, 2001 in Taejun, the membership had increased to about
4,000, and Myung Keh Nam was re-elected as president of Nosamo in July
2001 (Shin, 2002). Two noteworthy activities of the group were a group bicy-
cle trip from Pusan to Kwangju, four days and 300 km long, which was led
by Myung Keh Nam, and an eight-week long group-hiking trip. Nosamo
claimed that the Pusan-Kwangju bicycle trip was for the promotion of
regional unity between the Youngnam and Honam regions, while the hiking
trip was for the unification of North and South Korea. Through these and
other community service activities, Nosamo was solidifying the member-
ship networks and preparing itself for subsequent activities in support of
Roh Moo Hyun’s run for president (www.nosamo.org/home/etc/nosamo-
intro4.asp).
As mentioned earlier, the MDP leadership decided to introduce a presi-
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dential primary system that is similar to that of the United States. Poll after
poll showed that MDP’s popularity was rapidly declining, largely due to
the corruption scandals involving Kim Dae Jung’s sons and his inner circle
power brokers. Furthermore, MDP did very poorly in the October 25, 2001
special elections of the National Assembly. Thus, MDP had to come up with
a drastic measure that would alter the public perception of the party and
attract voters’ interest. The presidential primary would signify a democratic
procedure of selecting the party’s nominee, and it would mean an end of the
traditional, old fashioned national convention for nomination of the presi-
dential candidate. The old system tended to provide advantages to those
who have strong organizational “good old boy” networks within the party
and could generate a large amount of campaign funds. Since Roh Moo
Hyun lacked both the organizational support network within MDP, as well
as the connection to raise the campaign funds, the primary system would
have been the only avenue for Roh Moo Hyun to secure MDP’s nomination. 
It is important to review Nosamo’s activities in the MDP primaries and to
analyze the reasons why Nosamo was one of the most important factors for
Roh Moo Hyun’s win of the MDP nomination. Also, it is essential to investi-
gate the significant differences between Nosamo and other citizens’ organi-
zations. First, with regard to Nosamo’s activities in the primaries, the
recruiting of voters to apply for a slot in the “people’s electoral college” was
quite effective. In all 1,600,000 voters applied to be on the people’s electoral
college, that had 33, 250 positions. Utilizing the communication networks
on the Internet, Nosamo members aggressively promoted the participation
of voters in the primaries. Furthermore, once the electoral college members
were selected, Nosamo members conducted an organized campaign of writ-
ing letters to each of these members. Since telephone calls and mailing of
printed materials to the electoral college members are prohibited by law,
Nosamo members mailed them “hand-written” letters, which is allowed by
the election law, advocating voting for Roh Moo Hyun in the primaries. In
fact, Nosamo organized a campaign of “one member writing ten letters”
during the primaries (Yoon, 2002). 
Second, nearly three hundred members, who had paid their own expens-
es, would show up at each of the 16 sites of the primaries and would con-
duct the organized campaign activities at the convention halls. Many of
them came with their spouses and children, thus giving positive impres-
sions to the electoral college members of their commitment in supporting
Roh Moo Hyun, and with the family atmosphere they created. This certainly
changed the traditional election campaign scenes in that a great majority of
campaign workers at any political party convention site used to be paid
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campaign workers or hired hands by candidates. In fact, one of Nosamo’s
catch phrases was “Have Nots Can Do It!” (Roh, 2002). It implied that Roh
Moo Hyun could win the election even though he did not have political
organizational networks and money to finance his presidential campaign.
The voluntarism displayed by Nosamo was a departure from the top to the
bottom style of organized party politics, where the voice of an average par-
ticipant is not heard and a participatory democracy is not practiced (Chung,
2002; Yoon, 2002; Sohn, 2002). 
Third, from its inception, Nosamo has been a political fan club whose
members communicate with each other almost exclusively via the Internet.
It has attracted members in their 20s, 30s, and 40s who use the Internet reg-
ularly. It follows that information can be disseminated among the members
quickly and economically, and that follow up actions can be organized time-
ly and effectively. In a way, Nosamo was a joint product of the emerging
political philosophy among younger generations and their digital electronic
culture (Chung, 2002). The Internet user population has remarkably
increased over the past several years in South Korea. The number of
Internet users increased from 366,000 in 1995 to 9, 430,000 in 1999;
22,230,000 in 2001; and 26, 270,000 in December 2002 (Korea Times,
November 27, 2002; Korea Insight, January 2003). In this context, Nosamo
became a benchmark for a full scale “e-politics” of information society in
South Korea (www.sisapress.com/January 22, 2003/sisa-main-view). As
Chung (2002) noted, the “386 generation” was in search of a new political
leader who would represent their political perspectives, while Roh Moo
Hyun was in dire need of grass-roots voter organizations that would share
and support his political agenda. Hence, Roh Moo Hyun and Nosamo rep-
resented an ideal match. It should be noted that other major candidates
have had their own support groups, home pages, and the use of the Internet
for their networking. These include Lee Hoi Chang’s “Changsarang” and
Lee In Jeh’s “Insarang” (Chung, 2002; Yoon, 2002). Nevertheless, those polit-
ical support groups were not as effective as Nosamo, largely because the
political and personal images of both Lee Hoi Chang and Lee In Jeh as polit-
ical leaders were not consistent with those that inspired the “386 genera-
tion” voters (Yoon, 2002). 
As mentioned earlier, Nosamo was instrumental in Roh Moo Hyun’s suc-
cessful campaign in the MDP primaries. Afterwards, Nosamo was seeming-
ly ineffective in the actual campaign of the presidential election, largely due
to existing election laws that prohibited campaign activities by private orga-
nizations in support of a presidential candidate. Nevertheless, Nosamo still
played a critical role in Roh Moo Hyun’s election as president by generating
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS & INTERNET POLITICS 37
young voters’ interest in the presidential race. More importantly, Nosamo
was quite effective in informing the voters through the Internet about Roh
Moo Hyun’s positions on inter-Korean relations, on new approaches toward
Korean-U.S. relations from an equal status perspective, and on policies
regarding chaebols. Nosamo activities were believed to be effective in build-
ing an important voting bloc of young voters who overwhelmingly voted
for Roh Moo Hyun in the presidential election of December 19, 2002. 
Fourth, the organization of Nosamo as a grass roots/citizens’ organiza-
tion may have been influenced by the rapid growth of citizens’ organiza-
tions in Korea in the 1990s under the Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung
administrations (Cho and Park, 2002; Shin, 2003; Steinberg, 2000; Wein,
2000). In particular, the movement of the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000
General Election (CAGE), that blacklisted unacceptable candidates for their
nominations bids and organized a defeat campaign if they ran in the parlia-
mentary election of April 13, 2000, might have had some impact on the ini-
tial planning of Nosamo. Furthermore, both Nosamo and CAGE played
similar roles in bridging the gap between political and civil society in the
election process. However, Nosamo and CAGE are significantly different in
many accounts. As Sohn (2002) indicated, representatives of nearly nine
hundred civic organizations participated in CAGE; they were well known
veteran civic organization leaders, professionals, and experts in different
fields. In contrast, Nosamo membership included substantially more
diverse groups in terms of educational and occupational characteristics.
Nosamo was more truly a grass roots citizens’ organization than CAGE,
with regard to the composition of participants. CAGE attempted to influ-
ence the nomination of candidates by major political parties from outside of
the political arena. On the other hand, Nosamo was more directly involved
in the politics of a particular party, MDP, and their activities would be cate-
gorized as participatory politics or politics of engagement (Sohn, 2002). 
Moreover, CAGE employed a strategy of negative campaigning by black-
listing candidates and by organizing a defeat movement of those blacklisted
candidates on the basis of their unacceptable past ethical and political
behaviors (Cho and Park, 2002; Shin, 2003; Steinberg, 2000; Wein, 2000).
Nosamo, however, concentrated on a positive campaign in support of a spe-
cific candidate in the election process (Sohn, 2002). With regard to organiza-
tional structures, typical citizens’ organizations, including CAGE, tended to
have highly centralized power and decision making structures. The leaders
at the central office would make important decisions, and local chapters
would follow the directives from the central office. However, from its incep-
tion, Nosamo has given a lot of autonomy to local branches in organizing
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relevant activities, and important decision making was done through elec-
tronic balloting that involved the participation of the entire membership
without any exception (Sohn, 2002). 
The membership of Nosamo increased from about 500 at the time of the
inaugural meeting to about 4,000 one year later, about 40,000 two years
later, and more than 70,000 at the time of the presidential election on
December 19, 2002 (www.nosamo.org). In contrast, a great majority of citi-
zens’ organizations lack any sizable membership, and thus they are fre-
quently dubbed “citizens’ organizations without citizens” (Sohn, 2002).
Another important difference is the financial structure of the organizations.
Nosamo is strictly supported by contributions from its members. In most
cases, each member is expected to pay the same amount, and all expenses in
activities are out of the individual member’s pocket. In contrast, many citi-
zens’ organizations rely heavily on external funding, including government
funds and contributions from large corporations (Sohn, 2002). Furthermore,
some citizens’ organizations have a considerable number of paid permanent
staff at their central offices. Nosamo had only two or three paid staff at their
central office (Sohn, 2002). On the whole, these differences in the organiza-
tional dimensions between typical citizens’ organizations and Nosamo seem
to shed some light on the future directions of citizens’ organizations in
South Korea.
Reactions of “Netizens” to the Breakdown of the Alliance between Roh Moo Hyun
and Jung Mong Joon 
The popularity of Roh Moo Hyun had sharply increased in April 2002
when he virtually secured the MDP nomination by winning the primaries.
In some polls he was leading Lee Hoi Chang of GNP by a substantial mar-
gin, 60.5 to 32.6 percent. Roh Moo Hyun’s popularity, however, had drasti-
cally dropped since then, and he was trailing Lee Hoi Chang by June 2002:
48.9 to 36.3. The sharp decline in Roh Moo Hyun’s popularity in polls was
largely due to the scandals involving President Kim Dae Jung’s sons and
close associates. Thus, Roh Moo Hyun, as a presidential candidate of MDP,
President Kim Dae Jung’s party, was losing the support of voters mainly
because of his association with Kim Dae Jung and MDP. Roh Moo Hyun’s
popularity had remained nearly 10 percentage points behind Lee Hoi
Chang from June to November 2002. To worsen the situation for Roh Moo
Hyun, Chung Mong Joon entered the presidential race as a third party can-
didate in September 2002. Chung Mong Joon, a son of Chung Ju Young —
the late founder of the Hyundai Group, and a three-term, independent
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National Assembly member and head of the Korean Soccer Association,
was instrumental in the remarkable success of the Korean national team in
the 2002 World Cup that was hosted jointly by Korea and Japan in May —June
2002. 
Polls had indicated that Chung Mong Joon was a viable candidate in that
a substantial proportion of voters were turned off by both Lee Hoi Chang
being too conservative and by Roh Moo Hyun, on the other hand, being too
progressive. Some polls conducted in September 2002, about the time of the
declaration of his candidacy, revealed that Chung Mong Joon was ahead of
Lee Hoi Chang by two to six percentage points and that Roh Moo Hyun
was a distant third (Gallup Korea, December 19, 2002). However, Chung’s
popularity began to plummet amidst allegations against the Hyundai
Group of its illicit stock transactions and its involvement in a secret pay-
ment of $500 million to North Korea, in coordination with President Kim
Dae Jung, shortly before his summit meeting with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang
on June 15, 2000.
Since both Roh Moo Hyun and Chung Mong Joon were trailing Lee Hoi
Chang in the polls, they were motivated to form an alliance. The two camps
made an official announcement that they had agreed to field a single candi-
date on November 15, 2002. Roh Moo Hyun became the candidate of the
alliance on the basis of the results of special polls, and Chung Mong Joon
endorsed Roh Moo Hyun. Chung Mong Joon appeared with Roh Moo
Hyun at campaign rallies, and he gave speeches in support of Roh Moo
Hyun. Some newspapers reported that when the two camps agreed to form
an alliance and unify their candidacies, they also agreed that they would
share power in the next government and would allocate cabinet positions to
the coalition partner. It was also rumored that, although Roh Moo Hyun
agreed to provide the Chung Mong Joon camp with cabinet positions, he
refused to give a written promissory note on that agreement. In any case, on
December 18, 2002, Chung Mong Joon and Roh Moo Hyun appeared
together at a campaign rally in Seoul. At that rally there were people who
carried cardboard signs that read “Chung Mong Joon in 2007!” They intend-
ed to elect Chung Mong Joon as president in 2007, when the next presiden-
tial election will be held. After seeing those signs, Roh Moo Hyun remarked,
in the middle of his campaign speech and in the presence of Chung Mong
Joon, that “I can tell that you are the members of NA21 (Chung Mong Joon’s
party). I must point out that, in our party, MDP, we have two such promis-
ing candidates as Chung Dong Young and Chu Mi Ae as well. Thus, we
must wait and see!” Newspapers reported that Chung Mong Joon was
insulted by Roh Moo Hyun’s remarks and called an emergency meeting
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with his key confidants after the rally.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Chung Mong Joon directed his
spokesperson to announce that he was withdrawing from the alliance with
Roh Moo Hyun, and that voters should make their own decisions on whom
to vote for in the next day’s presidential election. Around nine o’clock that
evening, less than three hours before the day of the presidential election, the
major television networks reported the story. The television networks also
reported that Roh Moo Hyun attempted to visit Chung Mong Joon at his
home, but that Chung Mong Joon’s aides told Roh Moo Hyun that Chung
Mong Joon was already in bed and he was not available to meet with Roh
Moo Hyun at that time. Thus, the one month old, historic alliance between
two presidential candidates had ended just a few hours prior to the day of
election.
The news about the breakdown of the alliance had spread quickly among
voters, especially among young voters through the Internet and cellular
phones. Young voters in their 20s and 30s were reminding each other to
actually vote the next day, as well as encouraging each other to contact their
friends to vote. On the website of “Neighborhood News Corner,” an all time
record of 3,000,000 “hits” were registered between 12:00 p.m. on December
18th and 3:00 a.m. on December 19th, 2002. The number of hits on that site
during the early morning hours was nearly six times as much as the daily
averages. Regarding the role of Oh my News in this incident, BusinessWeek
(February 24, 2003) made the following observation: “While television and
the newspapers carried spotty coverage of the defection, Oh my News posted
nonstop video and text reports, attracting a half-million visitors in less than
12 hours. The next day, Oh my News’ loyal readers followed the unfolding
events on-line and via Web-link mobile phones. When conservative candi-
date Lee Hoi Chang started edging ahead, many of those same readers sent
out a blizzard of e-mails and cell-phone text messages encouraging friends
to go to the polls, helping Roh to secure a victory.”
In this sense, Chung Mong Joon’s withdrawal of his endorsement could
well have been a fatal blow to Roh Moo Hyun, but it also might have turned
out to be a wake-up call for young Roh Moo Hyun supporters to mobilize
their cohorts to participate in voting. 
On December 19, 2002, the Munwha Broadcasting Corporation (MBC)
conducted post-election polls to estimate the effects of Chung Mong Joon’s
last-minute withdrawal of his endorsement on the election results (
h t t p : / / w w w. h a n i . c o . k r / s e c t i o n - 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 / 2 0 0 2 / 1 2 /
0033000002002122055813.html). The survey included 358 respondents who
initially supported Jung Mong Joon in the presidential race but became Roh
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Moo Hyun supporters after the Roh-Jung alliance. The results of the survey
showed that about 65.9 percent of the respondents actually voted for Roh
Moo Hyun while 24.9 percent abstained and 6.1 percent voted for Lee Hoi
Chang (http://www.hani.co.kr/section-003300000/2002/12/
0033000002002122055813.html).
In addition, the survey also revealed that11.7 percent of those who were
supporters of Kwon Young Gil, the DLP candidate, cast their votes for Roh
Moo Hyun on the election day. Furthermore, Roh Moo Hyun’s lead over
Lee Hoi Chang in the polls that were conducted on December 18, 2002,
before the breakdown of the alliance and the day before the election, turned
out to be about the same as his winning margin in the election.
Thus, it may be reasonable to argue that the net effect of the breakdown of
the alliance was not great in either direction, mainly because of the lateness
of the incident. It is clear, though, that on-line message boards, Internet
news services, e-mails, and cell-phones made it possible for supporters of
Roh Moo Hyun to react to the crisis and to effectively manage the situation,
thus controlling possibly fatal damage to Roh Moo Hyun’s election. This
quick and effective reaction at a large scale would not have been possible
without the information networks of the Internet and the electronic culture
and competence of the young age group.
Anti-Americanism and the Internet
Although anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in the formal 50-
year history of Korean-U.S. relations, historically it was never a factor in
South Korean elections. However, anti-American sentiment was an impor-
tant factor that influenced the outcome of the 2002 South Korean presiden-
tial election. Interestingly, Oh my News was instrumental in publicizing a
fatal traffic accident in which two middle school girls were killed by a U.S.
tracked vehicle in June 2002, and the subsequent acquittal of the drivers by
the U.S. military court in November 2002. Oh my News also organized a
series of four-week long anti-American candlelight demonstrations,
demanding a formal apology from President Bush about the incident and an
immediate amendment of the Status of Forces Agreement between South
Korea and the United States. It was revealed after the election that a staff
reporter for Oh my News disguised himself as a reader and posted the first
message to organize the anti-American demonstrations. In any case, the
protestors held candlelight vigils near the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.
Thousands of young people participated in the demonstration nightly, and
it spread to other major cities during the critical period of the presidential
42 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
election campaign. The anti-American demonstrations essentially mobilized
young voters to support a progressive and nationalistic cause. It also divert-
ed possible attention from the problems caused by the revelation that North
Korea had restarted its nuclear weapons development program. On the
whole, Oh my News was largely responsible for encouraging the anti-
American demonstrations. In turn, the demonstrations helped Roh Moo
Hyun to get elected president by solidifying the young voters’ support, and
by minimizing the possible effects of the North Korea factor. 
Political Defection and the Internet
Another incident was regarded as a crisis in terms of Roh Moo Hyun’s
status as a presidential candidate. After Roh Moo Hyun’s popularity in the
polls had started to drop in May 2002, more than a dozen National
Assembly members of MDP left the party to pressure Roh Moo Hyun to
yield to a more viable candidate, namely Chung Mong Joon. Some of them
switched parties, and joined GNP. That was a serious blow to Roh Moo
Hyun’s candidacy. However, the defection of some prominent figures from
MDP triggered a series of interesting reactions from young supporters of
Roh Moo Hyun. Utilizing the Internet communication network, Roh Moo
Hyun supporters, spearheaded by Nosamo members, posted numerous
extremely negative criticisms about the politicians who switched their party
affiliation, and dubbed them “political migratory birds.” In addition, realiz-
ing the possible impact of the defections from MDP on Roh Moo Hyun’s
prospects of winning the election, the young Roh Moo Hyun supporters
organized a campaign fund-raising drive among grass-roots voters by sug-
gesting the use of a “piggy bank.” As a result, 7 billion Won was collected
for Roh Moo Hyun’s campaign fund. 
Retrospectively, from the standpoint of Roh Moo Hyun’s camp, these
defections might have been “a blessing in disguise.” That is, by accepting
these “migratory birds National Assembly members,” GNP might have
added to its dominance on the basis of the number of seats it held in the
National Assembly. However, it might have seriously tainted the political
image of the party, as well as the image of Hee Hoi Chang (Park 2002;
Weekly Donga, January 17, 2003). The party switching essentially represent-
ed “the dirty, old politics as usual.” Hence, it may be reasonable to speculate
that the defections of MDP National Assembly members did not hurt Roh
Moo Hyun’s cause. Rather, it might have backfired on GNP and Lee Hoi
Chang in the presidential race by providing supportive evidence for Roh
Moo Hyun camp’s claim that Lee Hoi Chang represented “old politics.”
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS & INTERNET POLITICS 43
DISCUSSION
The 2002 South Korean presidential election involved a race between two
candidates with diametrically opposite ideological, organizational, and per-
sonal characteristics. Both citizens’ organizations and Internet newspapers
have had significant effects on the presidential primaries and the main elec-
tion campaign by balancing hitherto uneven playing fields in the political
arena. Without the support of citizens’ organizations and the on-line news-
papers, a candidate such as Roh Moo Hyun, who has a progressive political
orientation, does not have well established support networks within his
party, and does not have political connections for campaign fund raising,
would not have a fair chance of winning the presidential election. 
In this sense, Roh Moo Hyun’s election has important implications for
future political dynamics in South Korea. First, through the 2002 presiden-
tial election, participatory democracy has increased in that grass roots orga-
nizations could play a powerful role in the political process and that the vot-
ers may be sensitized and mobilized through the electronic communication
channels, including the Internet. Second, the power and prestige of the tra-
ditional media has substantially declined with the emergence of the Internet
media. In the Roh Moo Hyun administration, it is expected that the Internet
media would play an increasingly important role in South Korean politics.
In fact, President Roh Moo Hyun gave Oh my News the first exclusive inter-
view as president before any major newspapers, television, and radio net-
works. In addition, Roh Moo Hyun’s transition team opened a Web site to
solicit citizens’ input on his cabinet and senior advisor appointments, and
more than 5,000 recommendations were submitted on line.
Third, the division between the traditional media — major newspapers
and television networks — and on-line news services would be intensified.
In particular, the major newspapers may continue to maintain conservative
orientations, while the on-line newspapers may manifest more liberal and
progressive orientations, in view of the characteristics of the readers for
each category of media. Fourth, the legislations of the legal guidelines on
the Internet news and information service organizations did not keep up
with the rapid growth of the Internet industry, and the lag has caused con-
fusion and problems. In particular, Oh my News’ broadcasting of a live inter-
view with a political candidate in the campaign process was ruled illegal by
the National Election Commission last year on the grounds that the Internet
news service is not considered a regular news media. However, the
Constitutional Court has subsequently ruled that Oh my News is recognized
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as a media outlet. In view of the increasing influence of Internet news ser-
vice organizations, it is expected that the National Assembly would take a
close review of the on-line news services and would legislate regulations on
the activities of the organizations. 
Finally, depending on the development of on-line news services, there
may be some backlash due to inherent problems of the Internet media. For
instance, there is an increasing public concern with possible abuses of on-
line message boards, commentaries, and debates on various cultural, eco-
nomic, political, and social issues. Due to anonymity in the on-line exchange
of viewpoints among the readers, it is possible to have inaccurate, sensa-
tional, and demagogic views posted on the Internet media. Furthermore,
personal attacks and trials on the Internet of public figures including politi-
cians, writers, artists, athletes, and performers in entertainment industries
have increased in recent years. This development would be detrimental to
the formation of public opinions and to the constructive exchange of views.
It is hoped that Roh Moo Hyun’s administration encourages the Internet
media to develop in the direction that contributes to the consolidation of
democracy in South Korea.
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